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ABSTRACT
The world-wide consolidation in the electronic trading industry has provided evidence
that small exchanges and trading portals need to deliver more than sophisticated
technology, streaming quotes and market data. In order to deliver value and survive, they
need to provide liquidity. Noteworthy among the most recent industry challenges is the
dismal performance of exchanges like the Belgian Stock Exchange that finally caved in
to the inevitable merger with the London Stock Exchange. The Italian exchange took
similar action and so did a number of other small exchanges in the European Union. This
development has exacerbated the debate over the need for small stock exchanges and
portals to exist unless they can provide both superior technology and liquidity.
This paper proposes to examine the performance of the Belgian stock exchange and a
select group of portals trading Belgian equities through the metric of liquidity access for
fostering trade execution and capital flows. Illiquidity and the dislocation of a number of
securities traded on the Belgian exchange are examined using transaction costs and the
price impact of trading (as opposed to just asset prices) to explain such lack of liquidity.
Concurrently, the intervention of aggregators of liquidity pools and the rising influence of
noise traders (hedge funds) are analyzed to provide a framework for understanding the
mechanisms used to attract liquidity. This serves to determine whether portals may
continue to attract large pools of liquidity.
In closing, we suggest that capital assets are probably not mispriced in markets served by
small exchanges, and thus arbitrage opportunities do not exist. Other factors related to
timing, anticipation effects and outliers are more significant in determining whether
liquidity providers initiate in those markets. The nature of the economies that these
exchanges are designed to support is also a contributing factor to the dislocation and
disintermediation of capital demand from local firms and truly large global organizations.
Thesis Supervisor: Roberto Rigobon
Title: Associate Professor of Applied Economics
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INTRODUCTION
The crisis that forced many European and American portals out of business and
precipitated the merger of the Belgian Stock Exchange (BSE) with Euronext raised
concerns over the viability of online trading platforms and small exchanges. This paper
examines the factors that led to the inevitable surge in mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
activity among exchanges and Internet trading firms and the overall consolidation of the
industry. In contrast with the long-held belief that the crisis was prompted by macro-
economic considerations or imbalances in the supply and demand for securities and
trading services, this paper analyzes the impact of liquidity, or the bid-ask spread in the
quote for securities traded on the BSE and online trading platforms, drilled down to four
dimensions that include width, depth, immediacy and resiliency.
Hawawini and Michel1 first raised the issue of the risk associated with the smaller,
thinner and less liquid Belgian Stock Exchange in 1979. Their study used William
Sharpe's Capital Asset Pricing Model2 to establish a relationship between reliability,
stability, size., liquidity, and structure of small exchange markets. To test the validity of
their model for Belgian securities, they used data from 1963 to 1976 and found that risk
measures were statistically insignificant when appraised by their T-statistic and average
betas. They also noted that the US markets, which were broad and highly liquid with
heavy trading, had less stable beta coefficients for individual stocks. One of their other
findings was that portfolios traded on the BSE were more stable over time than those
traded on larger stock exchanges, because by being listed in a small and regional market
"An Assessment of Risk in Thinner Markets: The Belgian Case", Journal of Economics and Business.
2 "Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Capital Markets Under Conditions of Risk, Journal of Finance. 1964
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BSE securities were isolated from "external disturbances" which caused them to attract
more liquidity.
Twenty years later, as the world entered a new era of trading, the basic tenet of the
HFawawini and Michel's study changed dramatically. The world financial markets began
to operate under a new paradigm using the Internet and online technologies. This resulted
in opening access to new liquidity pools. Financial markets participants had also changed,
thanks to increasing participation of institutional traders with higher levels of education
who saw no boundaries as they moved liquidity across the globe. Globalization took hold
thanks to access to faster and reliable communication across various channels. The face
of the average BSE investors had changed dramatically from Exchange trader to Internet
Direct Access trader. The end result was complete disintermediation of the value chain,
with direct access traders and hedge fund managers leading the way with new
sophisticated algorithmic trading. Exchanges have lost their monopolistic positions in
Europe and in the US, and the Belgian Stock Exchange was forced to merge with the
London Stock Exchange.
The liquidity crisis that hit the world's financial markets in 2000 exposed smaller
exchanges and large trading portals causing yet another transformation that led to a
second wave of disintermediation. At the same time the European Union (EU) was
entering a new phase of its common economic market process and needed to harmonize
its currency and financial markets regulations across member countries which in turn
affected the ability of smaller exchanges and portals to expand nationally.
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We conclude that it is indeed the requirement of liquidity, or lack thereof, which
prompted smaller exchanges like the BSE to merge, triggering the continuing wave of
consolidations that has spread to trading portals and larger exchanges. Technology also
played a significant role and rendered auction exchanges almost useless as the speed of
execution through the internet ushered in a new breed of liquidity providers who offered
better quality in execution, low cost and additional trading tools that added value to
investors. We also argue that in today's liquidity environment a multi-factor analysis of
stock betas using liquidity (or illiquidity) in a modified capital asset pricing model
provides a more accurate and realistic estimation of stock returns because traders who
seek to maximize return prefer to initiate (trade) in liquidity pools that are large enough
to help minimize the cost and liquidity risk of trading.
This paper is organized as follows: Section I examines the BSE and its structure and
offers background information on the exchange, its products and its evolution. Section II
examines the impact of the 1990 liquidity crises and provides an analytical review of the
dimensions of liquidity that may have driven markets lower, especially in Belgium.
Section III provides an analytical review of the coalescing phenomena that may have
hindered the growth and sustainability of small exchanges and trading portals. We also
examine the implications on the industry's structure in Europe and around the globe.
Section IV offers a background on the structural change that preceded the shock to
liquidity in 1999 and the one that followed in 2000. Section V presents our conclusions
and remarks. Appendices include supporting documentation on the liquidity changes
noted in Europe at the peak of the Internet trading boom.
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I. The Brussels Stock Exchange (BSE) and the BEL-20 Index
1.1. The Brussels Stock Exchange
The Brussels stock exchange - La Bourse des Fonds Public de Bruxelles - was
established in the early nineteenth century by government decree on July 2, 1801 under
Napoleonic rule. France ruled Belgium from 1795 to 1814. Belgium became fully
independent country in 1831, but retained much of the French system. Throughout this
period, agents de change, or brokers, were ministerial officials. They had a monopoly on
trading in government securities (a system that remained in force in France until 1987)
but were not permitted to trade for their own account as dealers.
The market operated with little regulatory oversight until the Great Depression of 1929-
1935, when the government issued the first rules for regulating brokerages by royal
decree, as part of a broader plan to stimulate the economy and capital markets. This
decree was the basis for markets regulatory oversight until 1990 when Belgium
introduced the Financial Transactions and Markets Act to modernize Belgium's stock
markets and make them more competitive internationally. In 1995, the EU Investment
Services Directive was set up to administer and supervise the securities markets. The
Brussels Stock Exchange was officially established by royal decree in 1999 as integrated
market operator comprising Belfox (Belgian Futures and Options Exchange), Bourse de
Bruxelles (BSX) and CIK (the Central Securities Depository). The Belgian Stock
Exchange operated using the following structure:
8
Figure 1. Structure of the Belgian Financial Markets
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In September 2000, amid slowing demand and low trading volumes, the BSE was
allowed to merge with the Paris Bourse and Amsterdam Exchanges to form Euronext, the
9
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first pan-European exchange. Euronext was the first fully integrated cross-border market
in equities and derivatives. The merger was as much an acknowledgement of the end of
the stock exchanges as we had come to know them over the past decades as it signaled
the dawning of a new breed of financial intermediaries and traders.
From a regulatory standpoint, companies traded on Euronext are listed on their home
markets, but their shares are now traded on a single platform spanning all participating
countries. Listing requirements have been harmonized, and efforts are now underway to
do the same for derivatives trading platforms, clearing systems and settlement systems.
1.2. The BEL-20 Index
BEL-20
Long name Belgian 20 Price Index
Owner/publisher/sponsor La Bourse de Bruxelles (Brussels Stock Exchange)
Constituents 20 Belgian blue chips
Construction principle Capitalization-weighted value ratio
Base date December 30, 1990
Base value 1,000.00
Interval of calculation Real time (since March 18, 1991)
The BEL-20 is an index of Belgian shares that provides investment results corresponding
generally to the price and yield performance of the entire universe of publicly traded
securities in the Belgian market. The index typically includes stocks that are traded
primarily on the Brussels Stock Exchange.
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The key to understanding how the BEL-20 index affects liquidity is to examine why it was
introduced and how this portfolio has impacted traders and investors in Belgian equities. The first
fundamental analysis of the Index conducted by Ronald Anderson and Olivier Scaillet3 in 1997
showed that shares within the BEL-20 shares are sensitive to the Belgian Franc (BEF)/$U.S.
exchange rate and the price of oil, suggesting that the index is probably skewed toward industrial
performance much in the same way as the Dow Jones. However, from a portfolio approach, the
index is a composite and capital-weighted index. This means that the holder of the Bel-20 takes a
position at the tip of the normal distribution of returns on the Belgian stock exchange because the
index portfolio accounts for a large portion of the equities traded on the Belgian Stock Exchange.
Beside, while not sold as such, this Index also gives the holder of Belgian bonds a call option on
the index.
Fi2ure 2. BEL-20 Average Monthly Index Values
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Not surprisingly, since the introduction of the Index, 85 percent of the volume on the
BSE has come from firms included in the Index.
3 "A new Index of Belgian Shares." Universite Catholique de Louvain.
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This has had huge consequences for Internet retail traders, since they are not typical buy-
and-hold investors. Not surprisingly, institutional, hedge fund and portfolio managers
have become the primary users of the Index using it as benchmark for asset allocation at
the expense of smaller web traders. Because these investors move massive amounts of
funds and therefore can affect liquidity and price, many small internet traders have not
been able to match their pricing power. Furthermore, spreads in these stocks have
narrowed, which makes them less attractive to Internet day traders. The Index has also
become a tool for derivative markets that are constructed so that they leave little room for
arbitrage opportunities and represent more than just a microstructure of the Belgian
securities market.
II. THE 1990s EXCHANGES AND PORTALS' LIQUIDITY CRISIS
2.1. Liquidity factor in stock returns
We have to go back to Acharya and Pedersen, and Andrew Lo and Jiang Wang's recent
studies to explain one key aspect of the impact of liquidity on stock returns during the
1990 crisis. They have all showed in their studies of equilibrium asset pricing with
liquidity risk4 (the risk arising from unpredictable changes in liquidity over time) that the
required return on a security depends on its expected illiquidity, the covariance of its own
return, illiquidity with market return, and market illiquidity, which may suggest the flight
to liquidity during that crisis. They propose a liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing
model to improve the accuracy of return estimations in order to compensate for the lack
of foresight that may have caused finance experts to miss the early signs of the 1990
4 "Asset Pricing with Liquidity Risk." CEPR Discussion Papers No 3749
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liquidity crisis. They note that if a security's liquidity is persistent, a shock to its
illiquidity results in low contemporaneous returns and high predicted future returns.
Tim Johnson also provides a perspective for understanding what happened by analyzing
systematic variations in market liquidity that arises in endowed economiess and offers the
view that since liquidity drops are tied to a country's real economic success, "an
individual security is more liquid if either its search technology is more efficient or there
are a larger number of agents seeking to trade it." Johnson's principal argument is that
price elasticities can be regarded as market impact functions that define bid-ask spreads
and thus liquidity is low when markets are low and expected returns and volatility are
high. He concludes that the liquidity of a securities market should be defined via "the
elasticity of the substitution from that security to cash-like asset." Thus, we can assume
that holders of suboptimal portfolios (Internet traders and market makers) demanded
compensation for holding them, and their risk tolerance determined the bid-ask spreads
they quoted to the investing public. As spreads widened, prices dropped, resulting in
falling markets.
2.2. Bid-Ask spread factor
While the studies referenced above can help us understand what happened, they need to
be balanced by acknowledging the impact of trading behaviors and risk anticipation
where trader's values are independent, as Michael Peters and Sergei Severinov6 observed.
Peters and Severinov liken Internet trading to an auction market where sellers are free to
5 Dynamic liquidity in Endowed Economies, London Business School, July 2004.
6 Internet Trading Mechanism and Rational Expectations. University of Toronto and Duke University.
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bid in any auction, and the results of traders' actions affect aggregate demand and supply.
Prices will rise until enough traders drop out of the bidding process to satisfy demand at a
given price for a given security that reflects all traders' rational expectations. The
conclusion that emerges from their study is that liquidity can be defined as a market
condition where traders can quickly buy or sell large numbers of shares when they want
at low transaction costs. It is measured by the average trading cost, such as the difference
between the market price at which an order is executed and the mid-price, regardless of
whether it is a sell or buy order. As such, a measure of liquidity is the bid-ask spread and
distinguishes between four dimensions of liquidity: width, depth, immediacy and
resiliency. The bid-ask spread for a given number of shares determines the width. Depth
refers to the number of shares that can be traded at given bid and ask quotes. Immediacy
refers to the amount of time it takes to execute a trade; and finally, Resiliency is the time
it takes before prices revert to former levels after a large order has been received by the
market. The quoted bid-ask spread captures the cost of immediacy. It also provides
insight into the dimensions of depth and width. The effective bid-ask spread is based on
actual transaction prices, and is therefore, potentially, a poor indicator of immediacy. It
generates infirmation on depth and width. Trade size affects these spreads as does
resiliency.
All these effects converged in Belgian markets as they staggered under the impact of the
world-wide market liquidity crisis. In 1998, the Computer Aided Trading System (CATS)
electronic market used in Belgium was organized as a limit order book where the cost of
immediacy was determined by orders available in the limit order book. The continuous
auction was organized as a discriminatory auction. A couple of years earlier, Degryse
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had studied 25 shares in the limit order book in Brussels six times a day during ten
trading days and measured the quoted spread (SQ) for an order size of Q Belgian Francs
as follows 7:
SQ A(Q) - B(Q)
(A(O) + B(0) ) / 2
where A(Q) stands for the average ask price of a quoted size Q, B(Q) the corresponding
average bid price, and (A(O)+B(O))/2 is the mid-price for the smallest quote size (zero). A
larger quoted size results by definition in a larger (or identical) average quoted spread, as
the limit order book widens if Q increases. This procedure is applied for the limit order
book excluding and including hidden orders.
In Degryse's study, electronic trading portals had the ability to show visible orders
(fragmented orders) only when bid and ask prices were stated. Thus, the quoted bid and
ask spreads were incomplete since hidden orders underestimated the true spreads for
larger trades and overestimated them for smaller ones. Consequently, larger institutional
traders rushed in to fill in order books of large trading portals.
2.3. Effect of cross-listings
The first threat to Belgian liquidity occurred when cross-listings began to proliferate due
to the harmonization of markets regulations of member countries for listing and trading
securities. The studies of Michael Halling, Marco Pagano, Otto Randl and Josef
7 The total cost of trading Belgian shares: Brussels versus London. Center for Economic Studies.
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Zechner8 substantiate evidence for this threat. Firms that cross-listed in order to access
foreign liquidity did so because trading and liquidity were converging on the most
dominant markets. Belgian companies were particularly likely to turn to the most
dominant markets after the EU harmonization, since the foreign investors felt they were
not at a disadvantage in competing with domestic investors. The clearest evidence of the
change in the liquidity profile of the Belgian stock exchange was provided by data on the
liquidity on shares traded on the BSE and cross-listed shares. Degryse analyzed this trend
in 1996 by comparing the cost for trading shares cross-listed on the BSE and the London
Stock Exchange9. He used transactions, quotation, and limit order book data to
investigate competition between the Brussels Computer Aided Trading System - CATS °
market - and London's Stock Exchange Automated Quotation - SEAQ International - by
measuring the impact on liquidity using the quoted and effective bid-ask spread. He
concluded that London's SEAQ International (SEAQ-I) had succeeded in capturing
considerable trading volume in non-UK equities from other EU exchanges. This was
particularly true for Belgian shares trading on London's SEAQ International and the
Brussels CATS market. He compared direct and indirect trading costs for Belgian shares
on both exchanges. He used a simultaneous record of quotes, limit orders, and
transactions in both Brussels and London. His data for Brussels encompassed all limit
orders. More precisely, the data incorporated not only the five best bid and ask prices and
corresponding quantities, but also the other limit orders in the book. In addition, the data
included hidden orders. As a result, he obtained unbiased estimates of the quoted bid-ask
spread. The latter reflected the cost of immediacy. The results indicated that the Brussels
8 "Where is the market? Evidence from Cross-Listings." University of Salerno, Italy.
9 "The total cost of trading Belgian shares: Brussels versus London." Tilburg University, Tilburg.
10 CATS was superseded by the New Trading System (NTS) in 1996.
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CATS market was considerably tighter than SEAQ International. However the SEAQ
market was deeper. The results was effective spread pointed in the same direction in both
cases. The advantage of Brussels in terms of the effective spread was smaller when
compared to the results obtained for the quoted spread. Degryse also investigated the
relationship between bid-ask spread and trade size. The quoted spread, by extension,
increased with trade size. This feature was more important for non-cross-listed shares.
The relationship between effective spread and trade size depended on the exchange.
Trade size seemed to be important on the Computer Aided Trading System, which
indicated a larger market impact for small and large trade sizes, and a smaller one for
intermediate trade sizes. The analysis of total trading costs indicated that Brussels was
cheaper for small transactions, while SEAQ International offered lower trading costs as
illustrated below:
Table 1. Percentage quoted spread for cross-listed shares on CATS and SEAQ-I
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The table above reports the percentage quoted spread for cross-listed shares on both
exchanges for various quoted sizes. The quoted bid-ask spread is the difference, for a
particular trade size, between the lowest ask price and the highest bid price quoted (the
inside market) on a market at a given point in time. The quoted bid-ask spread is
calculated on the basis of the CATS limit order book for Brussels, and market makers'
quotes on SEAQ-I. A summary of the information is provided in the last line of the table,
which gives an unweighted average of the spreads for all shares. The Brussels CATS
market is rather tight for some shares; the bid-ask spread for the fourchette' or inside
market (lowest ask and highest bid) is low. The quoted bid-ask fourchette varies from
0.22% for Delhaize (deh) to 0.52% for GBL. The market is not very deep. This is
reflected in a large bid-ask spread for larger quoted sizes, or even a situation in which the
limit order book runs out altogether. The quoted spread increases immediately with
quoted size. This explains to a large extent the concentration of financial activity. More
precisely, larger transactions frequently occur on SEAQ International, whereas smaller
ones take place on the Brussels CATS market. Other features, such as customer
relationships or the design of the trading system, may explain why investors might prefer
to trade on the less efficient market but the most insightful is the higher execution risk for
Belgian shares in Brussels compared to London.
The London market is a dealer market whereas the Belgian exchange is an auction
market. The former seems to be better suited for handling larger orders especially in light
of the mandatory trading volumes imposed by some exchanges, including the BSE. As a
result, spreads are less variable on the SEAQ since the market is deep and spreads do not
increase much with trade size, all of which leads to less execution risk for the Belgian
cross-listed shares. The SEAQ quotes are executable at the inside which is very attractive
for an investor seeking rapid execution and immediacy.
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Non-cross-listed shares are less frequently traded than the cross-listed ones. This is also
reflected in the liquidity of their markets. First, the market is not that tight (as can be
inferred from the higher quoted spreads at the inside market - fourchette). Secondly, the
limit order book runs out very fast. In addition, the quoted spread increases quickly with
trade size. In other words, the limit order book for the non-cross-listed shares is not deep.
Third, this suggests that traders willing to trade larger sizes against the limit order book
must split up their orders into smaller ones (fragmentation). The need for splitting up
trades is less present for the cross-listed shares. Traders submitting orders incur at least
two costs: direct and indirect trading costs. The first is measured by the commission rate.
The second represents the impact on the price of submitting an order, the spread. This
table adds both cost components to obtain a picture of the competitiveness of the Brussels
CATS and the London SEAQ-I market. Until 21 October 1994, commission rates on the
Brussels stock exchange were fixed according to a decreasing schedule. The commission
rate varied from 0.8% for transactions up to 5 million Belgian Francs (BEF) to 0.4% for
transactions of 30 million BEF. The London Stock Exchange publishes yearly an
overview of commission rates charged on SEAQ-I in its Stock Exchange Quarterly.
Comparison of both schedules shows that commission rates on CATS are substantially
higher than on SEAQ-I. In other words, in terms of direct trading costs, Brussels is more
expensive than SEAQ-I.
In order to determine which market is actually more efficient in terms of total trading
costs, the quoted spread is used as a measure for indirect trading costs. Applying the
same exercise with the effective spread would not yield additional insights. We take as
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indirect trading costs the unweighted average quoted spread for all shares. We offer total
trading cost measures for CATS up to 6 million Belgian Francs (BEF) and SEAQ-I up to
7 million BEF, as this is the deepest size available for all shares. CATS outperforms
SEAQ-I for deal sizes up to about 1.5 Million BEF. SEAQ-I provides lower trading costs
for larger trades. The CATS percentage trading costs increases with deal size, as the
quoted spread increases more than the commission schedule decreases. For Brussels,
commissions are the major part of total transactions costs. The reverse holds true for
SEAQ-I. The data on transactions are roughly consistent with this outcome. That is, large
orders occur frequently on SEAQ-I, whereas small ones take place on CATS. In deciding
where to trade, investors do not focus solely on trading costs. Therefore they do not
necessarily use the more efficient market in terms of total trading costs. There are other
features of a market's organization that are not reflected in the different measures of total
trading costs. Examples include customer relationships with one or the other market, the
differences in design of the trading system, and liquidity.
Commission rates on the Brussels stock exchange have been liberalized since October
1994. Some brokers and banks decreased their commission rates for large orders. Lower
commission rates in Brussels have affected the strategies of SEAQ-I dealers and they
have improved their quotes. Given the caveats mentioned above, trading costs in SEAQ-I
and CATS seem comparable following liberalization of the Brussels market. Therefore,
we can conclude that this liberalization enabled brokers to compete with SEAQ-I dealers
for larger deals. The result was the sharp contrast between reported trade volumes on the
BSE and other European Exchanges as illustrated below:
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Figure 3. Number of Shares Traded (2000)
The difference is even more pronounced when this comparison is carried out on the basis
of the value of shares traded. While the BSE has benefited as did other exchanges from
the increase in the number of clicks (trades) since 1999, it trailed all the European
Exchanges as illustrated below.
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2.4. Technology Innovation, Governance and Regulatory changes
The competition between exchanges and portals began around the mid 80s as the London
Stock Exchange Automated Quotation (SEAQ) began to drive cross-border equity trades
away from exchanges located in continental Europe by using a screen-based platform to
trade shares of non-UK companies. This led the exchanges to modernize and become
electronic as well. However, due to the structure of the markets, institutional traders still
needed to be members of multiple exchanges, pay membership fees and abide by local
government trading rules. The introduction of the Euro and the harmonization of capital
markets made such fragmentation obsolete and led to a consolidation of markets. The
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consolidation also had a significant impact on trading and liquidity as larger institutional
investors began to concentrate their trading on a few European financial centers where
they could access various pools of liquidity across the EU.
Liquidity was also affected by the change in the governance structure of the exchanges
themselves. Exchanges ceased to be mutuals owned exclusively by members, and became
public limited companies with shareholders. This trend went rapidly from smaller
exchanges to larger ones as technology brought down the technology cost investment
barrier to entry that had long kept many firms from offering the same services. This
brought about a more open and "level trading field" allowing banks to disclose their
conflicts of interest that had prevented them from acting as owners and users of
exchanges. Exchanges had two principal customers, firms that sought to be listed and
intermediaries that wanted to trade on the exchange. Thanks to the added transparency in
the markets, new exchanges that focused on trading were able to compete. Because of
their technological advantage, many took significant liquidity and market share away
from the established exchanges. The membership fee at Tradepoint for example was
£1,000 compared with over U.S.$1 million at the NYSE.
The pressure :for liquidity was fiercest among firms seeking permanent market making in
order to maintain adequate valuations for their companies. Firms with liquidity can
improve the beta of their stock which can have a significant impact on their internal cost
of capital using the CAPM formula. Thus secondaries (seasoned offerings) have
gradually sought trading platforms that offered deeper pools of liquidity rather than just
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the exchanges that became the purview of firms seeking access to public capital markets.
This led to a surge in cross-listings between the home exchange and exchanges that
offered the best prospect for liquidity. The change in governance contributed to
segmentation of the market as companies with limited float tended to migrate toward
platforms that offered deeper liquidity, while intermediaries were most likely to seek
avenues to trading large blocks or demand speed of execution.
The main objective of exchanges changed forever in the mid 1990s. Since exchanges
needed to do more than list companies to generate revenue, they competed for users who
generate large volumes of trades and thus generate higher liquidity. Technology had
disintermediated the market, allowing customers to find buyers and sellers of securities
directly without the need to go through the exchanges. With this double marginalization
eliminated, trading portals found it necessary to operate as networks to attract only those
investors that perceived their utility. Investors wanted liquidity and scale economies
expressed as lower cost of trades. They sought the lower spreads that come with
increased liquidity on exchanges and portals where most firms were traded.
Some evidence of home bias was still visible in the way fund managers directed trades
and in the quality of portfolios they held. Lutje and Menkhoff examined the home bias
effect" on the shares traded on European exchanges and portals. In their study of the
factors and driving forces in home bias, they looked at informational asymmetries and
advantages offered by home preference and noted that it no longer held true in the
Internet age. In fact, home bias gradually meant sub-optimal diversification and poor
" Discussion paper No. 296. May 2004. University of Hanover, Germany..
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performance. It was tied more closely to the degree of risk aversion of investors rather
than any rational approach to investing. Still, equity managers were more likely to
demonstrate home bias than bond managers.
Trading portals invested in technology to exploit the network effect and scale economies.
The network phenomenon became very important and had implications for both
competition and the explosion of trading portals that operated automated systems that
brought together buyers and sellers of securities over-the-counter without the same
burden of regulation that an exchange would face. Portals targeted end-users who had the
ability to search and compare electronic trading platforms based on cost, service,
convenience, speed, value of information and quality of communications. As Internet
trading grew popular, the business became commoditized, leaving very little room for
differentiation except on few attributes. The playing field was gradually leveling for new
market participants, such as smaller financial institutions, small and medium-sized
corporations, insurance companies, government agencies and even private investors - as
well as existing users. The bond market eventually followed through with quote driven
Euro-MTS system, leading others in search for better liquidity offered on trading
platforms and lower volatility. Derivatives platforms joined later as options, futures and
commodities traders followed their equity counterparts. This was the beginning of fully
integrated trading platforms.
By the year 2000, there were 27 trading portals in Europe, one of which operated in
Belgium. Most were registered as broker dealers and in a few cases as exchanges. They
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offered better functionality than exchanges as well as having better pricing and more
transparency in price information. Investors became less dependent on brokers or
intermediaries as the Internet provided them improved customer service through access to
real-time market data, historical data, documentation, greater accessibility, better pricing,
valuation models and risk analysis. Settlement, clearing and custody services were also
available on the Web, ushering in the advantages of straight-through processing (STP)
that allowed traders and market makers to trade, clear and settle on the same platform.
III. DISINTERMEDIATION AND THE 2000 MARKET BUBBLE
3.1. The Emergence of Day Traders
By 2002, nearly 200 European online broker sites were providing online trading. They
were led by Consors Discount Broker in Germany with 500,000 customers and C5 billion
in assets. The equity market fell that year sending the European top indexes down twenty
five percent (25%) which undermined these portals' growth. With consumers trading
volumes cut in half, these brokers began to accumulate staggering losses. This led to the
onset of aggressive cost-cutting. The brokers could only break-even if they served
frequent traders at low cost to attract infrequent traders. Consequently, brokers had to
achieve critical mass of frequent traders and focus their investment and sales effort
toward maintaining and nurturing the high-end, risk-friendly customer (known as "elite
brokers"), and active "day traders". The sites that were able to optimize their offerings
were those that could serve fewer frequent traders. These traders were expensive to
26
recruit and difficult to keep 2. Large banks began to fold their brokerage sites into
multichannel banking offerings to cut servicing costs and serve infrequent traders with
simpler offerings. According to Forrester research, the result was integrated brokerage
service earning about 10 euros per customer. Although this service doubled investor base,
it still was not sufficient to cover infrastructure costs. Forrester Research also reported, at
the peak of the Internet boom in 2002, that the number of people trading stocks and
bonds on-line across Europe was expected to rise from 3.2 million to close to 10 million
in 2007. As they rode the dot.com frenzy, many people became "day traders," trading
stocks and shares over the Internet in the hope of making a killing. Several analysts
believe that the early success of many on-line brokerages was due primarily to the
activities of these "day traders."
Germany was predicted to become the biggest market by far growing from an estimated
1.7 million on-line traders in 2002 to almost 3.5 million in five years. As the number of
traders rose, the kind of people who actually traded changed dramatically; More and
more traders who went on-line in Europe could only be classified as "cautious." The "get
rich quick" traders, on average, completed around 19 transactions per year, while
"cautious" traders completed only one and two per year. Newer research by Forrester
showed that the fastest growing segment of traders would be the cautious savers who
would account for 24 percent of the market. The projection for the "get rich quick"
traders saw their relative numbers fall to just 23 percent of the market. All of this
suggests that as banks and other financial services companies moved forward, more
12 Commission Break Even was Euro220/year according to Forrester research.
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products aimed at cautious investors were needed. Consequently, intermediaries needed
to launch more "hand holding" products.
3.2. Market Disintermediators
By 2001, decimalization in the US and the increasing rarity of the so-called "day traders"
of the Internet boom had an impact on the revenues and the Net Capital of many larger
brokerage houses dependent on high-frequency traders. Charles Schwab discount
brokerage cut 10 percent of its staff, or about 1,880 employees, to cope with weak client
trading volume. At that time, it processed a daily average of 117,500 revenue trades,
down 25 percent from 2000.
There had been a high level of interest in the banks' services. This allowed customers to
buy and sell shares over the Internet without having to open a separate trading account.
One of the advantages bankers had over competitors in this space was their ability to
work from their own customer base, since many customers already banked on-line.
Furthermore banks were able to build their services from existing infrastructure, which
kept costs down. Another unique feature was that trades were settled immediately with
funds paid into or debited from the customer's account. It was also only "execution"
meaning that they offered no advice on whether shares should be bought or sold. In
addition, shareholdings were held in electronic form on behalf of the customer rather than
in "paper" certificate form. The service was developed by firms like Goodbody
Stockbrokers, a fully owned subsidiary of Ireland's AIB Bank. "It allows people to buy
and sell stocks while sitting at their PCs and without having to try and get through to their
stockbroker" admitted on of its managers.
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Europe's online retailers were not paying sufficient attention to fulfillment costs, trusting
that growing volumes and squeezing vendors would solve their cost problems. Complex
and expensive online retail fulfillment costs form the bulk of retailers' operating costs (15
per cent of sales on average). Good cost control in this area required three skills: accurate
demand forecasting, creative labor management and central vendor partnering, none of
which trading portals possessed.
Finally, electronic derivatives trading had begun to break down traditional market
barriers and change the nature of business relationships. The Internet enabled traders to
access and exchange information quickly and easily, and to serve multiple customers
simultaneously. Delivery, pricing, trade analytics, information provision and
competitiveness changed fundamentally as a result.
IV. THE NEW ONLINE TRADING PARADIGM
4.1. The Growth of Online Trading
The introduction of Internet trading led to a worldwide increase in total executions in
value and volume of shares traded, which also affected volatility on most exchanges.
Was the increase in trading coincidental to the spread of the Web or was it a direct result?
James J. Choi, David Laibson, and Andrew Metrick13 attempted to answer this question.
Their research led them to conclude that there was evidence that the effect of Internet
trading was very large on trading frequency, turnover and transaction size. They also
found that young, male traders with high salaries and retirement plan balances were most
13 How does the Internet affect Trading? Evidence from Investor behavior in 401 (k) Plans. Journal of
Financial Economics.
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likely to trade via the Web, consistent with societal stereotypes of Web traders.
Conversely, retired and job-terminated participants were less likely to trade using the
Web. The authors speculate that since ex-employees were out of the workplace, they
were less likely to know about plan changes like the new Web-based trading
opportunities. Participants who traded frequently by phone prior to the introduction of
Web trading were also less likely to try the Web. The lower effort cost of Web
transactions led this class of traders to execute smaller dollar value transactions in their
Web trades relative to phone trades. Consequently, small trades that were not worth a
time-consuming phone execution were performed quickly on a Web-based trading
system. Per Choi, Laibson and Metrick, the average phone transaction per their data was
75 percent larger than the average Web execution. In their analysis, these differences
were driven by demographic contrasts between the typical phone and Web traders. While
high balance retirement plan participants (usually older) were most likely to try the Web,
low balance participants (usually younger) were most likely to trade frequently on the
Web. Hence, low balance participants conducted a relatively large share of Web
transactions.
Thanks to the Internet and the spread of online trading, commission costs on buying and
selling stocks plummeted as trading volume soared, encouraging individuals to trade
more than ever. In general, economies benefited from more trading, but it is disturbing
that the trading surge took place in retirement savings plans, an investment vehicle where
investors should be patient and have long-term objectives rather than wheel and deal for a
quick buck. Internet traders challenged financial market theory and history wherein a
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disciplined, long-term approach with minimal trading would greatly increase the odds
investors will reach their long-run financial goals. Even after accounting for stock price
volatility or increased overall market volume, the Web effect remained very significant.
Daily trading frequency nearly doubled, and daily turnover -- the fraction of balances
traded - increased significantly as well. The transaction frequency effect was greater than
the turnover effect because Web access lowered average transaction size and increased
Web trading on low-balance accounts belonging to young traders.
Choi, Laibson, and Metrick found that most participants who tried the Web stuck with it.
Of those participants who tried the web, 88 percent made their next trade on the web.
Conditional on a first and second Web trade, 94 percent made their third trade online, and
96 percent of Web traders made their fourth trade online.
4.2. Changes in Regulatory Frameworks and EU Harmonization
The US has always been the trend setter in the brokerage industry. As a result when the
"IT revolution" of the mid-seventies brought about innovation in information and
communication technology, it had a particularly dramatic impact on the financial services
industry world-wide, especially trading execution. Furthermore, the enactment of the
Electronic Funds Transfer Act by Congress in 1978 set the stage for the use of electronic
systems to transfer funds and provided the potential for substantial benefits to consumers.
The ensuing improved stability and efficiency of the financial system was followed by
speedy processing and transmission of information that enabled cost reductions, wider
networking and globalization on an unprecedented scale. The Electronic Funds Transfer
Act authorized financial institutions to make electronic funds transfer terminals available
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to their customers, protect the privacy and security of customers, prohibit unfair
discrimination among financial institutions and monopolistic practices in the use and
availability of electronic funds transfer terminals. It also prescribed remedies and
penalties.
The combination of change in the regulatory landscape and the advent of new technology
paved the way for the entry by a handful of smaller convenience-oriented banks seeking
to take advantage of the lower price offerings that electronic banking allowed.
These banks sought to take advantage of the low cost for servicing price-sensitive
consumers. In the maturing traditional banking industry, differentiation was geographic
and focused on customer income. Large and smaller banks had failed to address changing
customer needs and customer segmentation gaps prevailed throughout the industry (from
consumer finance to commercial banking). When the Federal Reserve Bank relaxed some
of the reserve requirements against specific assets and deposits, bank members began to
engage in sweep activities to move reserves into more productive uses, unlocking a vast
amount of liquidity that had long been trapped under manual and bureaucratic processes
both of banks and the federal reserve system. Since the Fed does not pay interest on
monies on reserve, these institutions had an added incentive to become efficient at
sweeping idle balances and used the deployment of technology at large money center
banks to minimize reserve balances. The introduction of technology also made it easier to
direct funds firom the Federal Reserve, setting off a trend that permeated other segments
of the consumer banking industry and leading to the explosion of B2B and B2C. This was
the beginning of a tidal wave that changed the face of the banking industry, unleashing
massive capital investments in Internet banking, consumer finance and electronic trading.
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The information technology revolution offered a great opportunity for money center and
regional banks to leap forward in the Internet age where they stood to benefit from
advantages of scale and reach, thanks to the American consumers' growing adoption of
the Internet. By allowing financial institutions to engage in a broader spectrum of
activities, and in essence repealing parts of the Glass-Stegal Act (that sought to limit
banking activities), the Financial Service Modernization Act of 1999 (a.k.a. Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act) encouraged the convergence of the banking, insurance and securities
industries while maintaining appropriate safety and soundness safeguards. Legal barriers
that had historically separated these industries were substantially eliminated from federal
law, and the new federal law preempted any impeding state law in many respects. The
concept of separation between banking and commerce was clarified, reaffirmed and
reinforced by the Act.
The advance of information technology not only strengthened the incentive of non-
financial business firms to engage in banking but also ushered a new breed of broker-
dealers known as discount brokers into the financial markets using the Internet. They
included firms such as Charles Schwab, Ameritrade, E-Trade, Instinet, Bloomberg
TradeBook, LLC, Island, Archipelago and DLJ Direct.
Traditionally the EU securities markets operated as cartels with vertical integration as a
result of the currency segmentation of the markets with limited number of exchanges and
multiple clearing and settlement structures. Since the early 80s, EU securities market
regulators began to strive to integrate their markets and address the constraints raised by
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technological advances. EU policy makers needed to revisit the regulatory set-up of their
securities markets and set up a Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) in 1999 to address
the ancillary coordination issues. The initial task of the FSAP focused on legislative
procedures and mechanisms for stimulating the functioning of their markets among all
involved intermediaries and institutions. Market supervision was a key concern, given
large differences in legal and institutional structures among member countries.
Noteworthy among the obstacles was the "single passport" to eliminate barriers at the
national level.
By and large, regulatory matters centered on: (i) the clarification of objectives and level
of regulation; (ii) interpretation and enforcement of securities market rules; and (iii) the
harmonization needed for mutual recognition. The "country of origin rule" for the
application of conduct of business rules in cross-border securities trading was also an
important consideration.
With the emergence of Alternative Trading Systems (ATS or trading portals) in the early
1990s, the Investment Service Directive (ISD) was established to strengthen rules for
cross-border trading and address listing and trading rules. The Forum of European
Securities Commission (FESCO)14 was also created to establish standards of conduct for
14 The Forum of European Securities Commissions (FESCO) assembles the following 17 statutory
securities commissions of the European Economic Area (EEA): Bundes-Wertpapieraufsicht (Austria);
Commission bancaire et financiere/Commissie Voor Het Bank- en Financiewezen/ Kommission fur das
Bank- und Finanzwesen (Belgium); Finanstilsynet (Denmark); Rahoitustarkastus (Finland);
Commission des operations de bourse (France); Bundesaufsichtsamt fur den Wertpapierhandel
(Germany); Capital Market Commission (Greece); Financial Supervisory Authority (Iceland); Central
Bank of Ireland; Commissione Nazionale per le Societa e la Borsa (Italy); Commission de surveillance
du secteur financier (Luxembourg); Stichting Toezicht Effectenverkeer (Netherlands); Kredittilsynet
(Norway); Comissao do Mercado de Valores Mobiliarios (Portugal); Comision Nacional del Mercado
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market participants, especially for institutional investors. The result of theses actions was
the separation of listing and trading which, in essence, redefined the role of exchanges as
institutions that serve the public interest with the principal duty of ensuring the listing
function. This was indeed a restructuring of the exchanges. Thus the trading function was
more the purview of trading platforms that included the exchanges themselves. Clearing
settlement and custody was kept separate to "maintain a competitive and open
environment". The EU regulators felt that this restructuring would maintain a necessary
fragmentation and a level playing field among intermediaries. This redefinition of the
Exchanges and their role in the financial markets was a key development in the
transformation of European markets. The business of exchanges was redefined to include
activities that earned fees on transactions, price quote services and membership fees.
Exchanges also kept listing authority but clearing and settlement was no longer a
necessary part of an exchange. Trading platforms were redefined as transaction
companies that bring together buyers and sellers of equity shares, derivatives and
commodities products on a virtual platform that indicates prices and volumes, routes
orders, and provides execution services. While exchanges were allowed to offer trading
platforms, this development was critical to fostering a segmentation of the market that
encroached on the traditional largest revenue base of most exchanges. European
exchanges generated most of their income through trading, followed by services such as
de Valores (Spain); Finansinspektionen (Sweden); Financial Services Authority (United Kingdom). The
European Commission attends FESCO meetings as an observer. The Chairman of the IOSCO European
Regional Committee is also invited as an observer. FESCO is chaired by Georg Wittich, Chairman of
the Bundesaufsichtsamt fur den Wertpapierhandel (Germany).
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listings, clearing, settlement and data license and membership fees as illustrated in table
below:
Table 2. Exchanges Revenue (1998)
Type of revenue EU Exchanges US Exchanges
Listing fees 19.3% 32.1%
Transaction fees 45.1% 39.7%
Services 24.4% 22.6%
Other 11.2% 5.7%
Source: FIB V data 2001
This structural change in revenue allocation set off the consolidation of emerging
European markets as they sought to maintain their leadership in trading which could now
only occur with liquidity.
Finally, the introduction of the Euro in 1999 can be credited for unleashing a deeper
transformation in the EU securities markets as well. As technology caused physical
Exchange floor trading to disappear in favor of anonymous trading, so did the
introduction of the Euro, because it took away many of the home biases.
4.3. World-wide market consolidation
At the turn of the century, there were thirty two (32) large exchanges in Europe. That
number has been reduced to three with prospect for a further consolidation as the
Deutsche Bourse that operates the Frankfurt Exchange considers the acquisition of the
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London Stock Exchange. This move to acquire Europe's largest exchange by volume of
shares traded underscores the need for liquidity to offset two critical factors that have
changed the industry landscape across Europe, Asia and the United States. Volumes on
Exchanges are stagnant and competition from electronic trading platforms has cut trading
fees by nearly 12 per cent according to a recent report by the Wall Street journal. It is
expected that acquisitions produce cost savings and attract larger pools of liquidity, these
being the only options for survival of these exchanges. The battle for control of the LSE
is just a recent illustration of the importance of liquidity, because the LSE is increasingly
the destination of choice of market makers and other dealers of security who perceive its
platform as having less imbedded execution risk due to the size of liquidity that it attracts.
The recent decline in the value of seats on the world largest stock exchange has raised
concerns about the automation of the NYSE and the ability of its specialists to survive a
growing trend toward online trading. Seat prices dropped from $1.04 million to $0.975
million between November 2004 and January 2005 and are down significantly from a
record $2.65 million 5 years ago. The dramatic drop in prices signals the change in
investors' perception of the value of trading through the specialists when the vast
majority of liquidity pools are accessed via Internet portals. Although the NYSE is still
the destination of choice for over 82.9 per cent of the equities traded in the US, it is
rivaled by its European counterparts who benefit from more efficiency and transparency
thanks to electronic trading. Among the various issues facing the NYSE and other
exchanges are operating cost rise and declining trading volume. Although the Exchange
has increased its trading volume against rivals NASDAQ and Archipelago, its market
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share for equities has dropped slightly below 80 per cent. The Exchange itself is now
considering a change to allow trades to be executed electronically, bypassing the
specialist and depriving them of potential income, a development that may have
contributed to the cut in the value of the NYSE membership. The proposed SEC
regulation to divert some orders to electronic markets is also a source of concern. The
NYSE is exploring new avenues to increase share volume, which include the possibility
of longer trading hours to attract more international business for the exchange. This
would inevitably allow the NYSE to compete with the European exchanges for liquidity,
trading and listing. The 212 year old exchange is indeed acknowledging the changing
competition dynamic and chances are that it will amend the regular trading session
schedule to compete globally.
The current battle for the acquisition of the LSE by the Deutsche Bourse and the M&A
activity in the trading portal space demonstrate structural constraints arising from lack of
liquidity to support the excess capacity built five years ago in anticipation of higher
trading volumes. Those barriers are not likely to fall soon, as Investment Technologies
Group, Inc. (ITG), Instinet and others have discovered. Liquidity is the key driver of the
increasingly competitive and commoditized electronic trading industry.
V. ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES
Electronic derivatives trading broke down traditional market barriers and changed the
nature of business relationships. The Internet enables traders to access and exchange
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information quickly and easily, and to serve multiple customers simultaneously.
Delivery, pricing, analytics, information provision and competitiveness are all
undergoing major changes fundamentally as a result. Lieng Seng Wee and Judy Lee1 5
explored the impact the Internet and electronic platforms on derivatives trading, and the
new opportunities opened to market participants. They concluded that "the Internet was
poised to become the central platform that allows wholesale financial players to conduct
their business more efficiently, rapidly and cost-effectively." In their view, the trading
paradigm itself was due to change as large financial intermediaries and money center
banks jumped on the band wagon. Noteworthy among them were Morgan Stanley with
Creditex, its new Internet-based global trading and information company for credit
derivatives, launched with the financial backing of JP Morgan and Deutsche Bank
following the model outlined in figure 5 (see page 41).
When on-line brokers like Ameritrade first started up, few on the institutional side of the
business considered them a threat. More recently, on-line equity trading firms such as
E*Trade, Charles Schwab and DLJ Direct have left some of the more traditional financial
institutions standing. Many are still playing catch-up, while losing trade, money and
liquidity to electronic upstarts. Today, no financial institution can afford to ignore the
opportunities provided by the Internet and electronic platforms.
Eurex, the Swiss/German electronic futures exchange, is a good example of the power of
electronic trading. It has leapfrogged over its rival, the London International Financial
15 Lieng Seng and Judy Lee. "Breaking Barriers", Risk Magazine, Electronic Trading Supplement.
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Futures and Options Exchange, in terms of trading volumes. Average daily trading
volumes on Eurex almost doubled in a year, to 1.6 million contracts in November 1999.
Lower transaction costs were one of the keys to that exchange's success. Online traders
and information providers have virtually squeezed brokers out of the market. Brokers will
have to provide genuine value-added services - knowledge, content and depth - to
survive. Trading houses will find their roles changing. Increasingly plain vanilla
derivative products will trade on electronic platforms. Existing sales staff will be able to
concentrate on promoting their electronic trading system to new clients since they can use
the Internet to channel product offerings to meet specific client needs as well as to view
their clients' needs on a real-time basis. Traders are now free to concentrate on more
complicated and structured products, and eventually products with increasing complexity
will also trade electronically.
The Internet attracts a wide range of potential clients to visit, browse, and study offerings,
price, and test and execute trades. Gathering a database of Web site visitors provides the
opportunity for financial institutions to cross-sell new products and services and improve
customer loyalty by providing targeted information. Electronic trading is also leading to
the integration of back-office processes. The potential for T+I (real-time plus one day)
clearing and settlement and global straight-through processing has become real.
Derivative portals could potentially support all components of the value chain and allow
customers to outsource the majority of their back-office processes with significant cost
savings.
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Figure 5. The Changing Internet Trading Paradigm
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Online brokerages are now changing their business model and are no longer competing
on cost alone as illustrated below:
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Instead, they are offering customers financial information and advice, quality customer
service, and innovative technology. Discount online brokerages, in particular, are
focusing on innovative technology to attract customers. Seventy-seven percent of
discount firms offer real-time streaming quotes, none of the full-service brokerages does.
CONCLUSION
The recent changes in the structure of stock exchanges and trading portals in Europe and
especially in Belgium demonstrate that European markets development have promoted
their integration. The trend toward more horizontal integration of markets has benefited
larger exchanges where cross-listing was most likely to occur. Smaller exchanges were
confronted therefore with the only remaining option of building derivative products to
entice firms seeking to arbitrage the national economies and not the performance of a
single stock. In the long-term, this has been good for financial markets in general because
these actions removed unnecessary speculative volatility from markets that might not
have otherwise grown at sustainable rates. The result of stable markets is deeper and
more resilient liquidity as we have noted in the cross-analysis of the London stock
exchange and the BSE. An examination of the recent liquidity addition to the Belgian
exchange as a result of the introduction of the Bel-20 index also corroborates our
observation regarding the use of an index to arbitrage local economies and their positive
effect on the liquidity of stocks included in that index.
In Arrow Debreu's world there is no such thing as financial intermediation. But as this
case proves, the Belgian economy has benefited from frictions that favored
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intermediation of financial contracts, markets and institutions. These intermediaries have
facilitated pooling of capital and risk, providing investors with access to liquidity who
would have been otherwise forced to withdraw funds or sell assets from investments. In
this and many regards, greater liquidity has given lenders and borrowers greater access to
long-term capital at the aggregate level, thus spurring Belgium's economic growth.
The incentive for stock market participants has also changed in the past decade. Buy and
hold strategies have given way to a new paradigm bolstered by the size and globalization
of stock markets and their liquidity and the dilution of corporate control and governance.
New intermediaries' groups have acquired the capacity to mobilize capital and stimulate
specialization in the Belgian economy. In equilibrium, the new and old actors in the
Belgian financial markets have made these markets more efficient thanks to increased
access to liquidity.
Trading portals emerged first and foremost because of the technology they provided.
There is evidence that Internet traders focused only on one aspect of liquidity, speed of
execution. This aspect was not sufficient to sustain liquidity in their platforms. Eventually
the law of averages caught up with them as deep liquidity seekers focused on venues that
provided quick access to buy and sell securities for increasing trade size. The result was
that exchanges and portals that provided liquidity were able to modernize their
technology and offer a wider array of services. The segmentation advantage that trading
portals offered at the beginning of the Internet boom dissipated quickly when Banks and
other intermediaries entered the online trading space.
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Looking to the future, disintermediation should serve the surviving players well. The new
traders will no longer be those seeking to trade on the speculative impulse of other
auctioneers in the market, but rather disciplined investors seeking to take advantage of an
arbitrage opportunity (hedge fund) or trade an index to gain exposure to an economy or
sector. This gives further merit to examine the issue through the lens of the liquidity
adjusted capital pricing model in order to account for the lack of or increase in liquidity.
As Acharya and Pedersen suggested, a security's return depends on the covariance of its
own return and illiquidity and market return and market illiquidity. As we have observed
in the case of several securities currently included in the Bel-20, their "net betas" have
improved with liquidity and suffered when market illiquidity has increased, thus causing
a sell-off. The net beta therefore is a function of the stocks tradability in periods of
market downturn and illiquidity.
Stock markets and indexes have become more volatile and may fluctuate in response to
news and economic development, a political event, the introduction of regulation, market
conditions and the adverse behavior of an issuer. The increasing volatility in world
exchanges has allowed Direct Access Trading (DAT) to expand, aided by the deployment
of smart routing systems that give these traders the ability to execute series of limited
orders like market orders, thus enabling spread savings with minimal risk for not being
filled or not liquidating a position quickly enough. The performance of exchange traded
funds and indexes may vary with timing, additions or deletions from the Index. In
addition, foreign securities involve a greater risk including the risk of currency
fluctuations. These new market attributes continue to create the enabling conditions for
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Direct Access Traders (DATs) to prosper as traders seek arbitrage opportunities and
short-term speculative profits.
Today's internet traders have the training and knowledge of trading strategies that allows
them the opportunity to trade directly with various points of liquidity (execution
destinations) across the globe without the manual intervention of a broker. Noteworthy
among recent developments is the introduction of risk management tools that allow these
traders to view exposures and margins as a single unit, and drill down to their detailed
exposures in any given market or exchanges. Routing engines have the capacity to accept
market data feeds, use these risk management tools to check various parameter limits,
send orders to trade out of any risky situation and handle an increase in volume to support
derivatives through an exchange specific algorithm across multiple time zones. Favorable
regulatory reforms around the world, improving connectivity and front-end technologies
and diminishing costs for order flow will serve to boost this segment of traders that
already represents about 19 per cent of NASDAQ and NYSE trade volumes and 30 per
cent of shares traded through Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) according to
a recent report by the Tower Group in the US.
The consolidation in the exchange and trading portals will expand toward the point where
the convergence of liquidity and technology is optimal, thus allowing internet traders to
compete on an almost leveled playing field with market makers and specialists. It is
therefore conceivable that the structure of capital markets as we know it today will
change and be replaced by regional exchanges trading electronically. Portals, as we have
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known them, will gradually disappear in favor of electronic exchanges with E-trading
platforms. This new focus probably will be on value-added services to de-commoditize
trading executions. Already we are witnessing an increase in the use of sophisticated
algorithms that allows computer trading programs to trigger buy and sell orders that
sweep liquidity through various pools of available shares of stocks in multiple exchanges
without any human intervention. This enables portfolio strategists to take positions in
particular securities or indexes or to take advantage of mispricing or mistimed positions
that they can exploit. The emergence of hedge funds is yet another indication of the
importance of liquidity. As a combined group these firms have been able to attract over
U.S.$1 trillion in assets that they have the freedom to move with little regulatory
oversight. Already firms like Fidelity, Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch in the U.S. are
seeking deeper involvement in electronic trading to meet the demand of holders of large
pools of liquidity such as hedge funds who need access to increasingly larger shares in
order to execute sophisticated trading strategies that require frequent entry and exit from
markets. The impact of externalities arising from traders on exchanges and portals is also
strongly felt in Europe where capital flows are consolidating to manage the same need
that global investors have for high liquidity.
The changing landscape of the securities markets and the increasing effort by exchanges
and portals to introduce new services and products is not likely to abate. Over time, it is
likely that exchanges will become just large consolidated portals allowing a trade to be
entered in one market and traded across several exchanges and then cleared and settled at
its destination with little or no human intervention. Investors demand cheaper, faster
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service and the U.S. floor-based futures and options exchanges are also moving to
electronic trading thus ending face-to-face barter altogether. The issues here are more
than economics and cost, it is also about technology. In an automated market, market
makers automatically send data to exchanges' servers with the number of contracts they
are willing to buy or sell. The quotes are passed around electronically to investors and
brokers who only need to click a button to execute a trade. Automated quotes can handle
an unlimited number of quotes, something which is impossible for a specialist to do, and
it takes milliseconds. In today's trading environment, it is impossible to articulate the
value for keeping a floor-based exchange. They are bound to disappear within a few
years.
The world financial markets have adopted electronic trading and cross-listings will
continue unabated. Even the NYSE cannot escape the pressure of electronic trading. It
recently announced plans to adopt a hybrid form which is simply a transition to full
electronic trading in the years ahead. This is acknowledged by the NYSE's decision to
acquire electronic trading exchange and former ECN Archipelago. The NASDAQ
retaliated by acquiring Instinet Trading to capture market share (and trap liquidity) and
prepare for the intensifying price war in the increasingly commoditized electronic trading
space. The Philadelphia Stock Exchange just announced its intention to seek a merger
partner citing the liquidity squeeze that the NYSE and NASDAQ mergers will inflict on
its business.
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